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LEGISLATION NOTE
HIGHWAY SAFETY-MENACE ON OUR HIGHWAYS-IS
IMPLIED CONSENT THE ANSWER?
At this present juncture in United States history we continually hear the
outraged cries of those who object to the deaths and injuries of our fellow
citizens in a war halfway across the globe. Millions of Americans are protest-
ing against, praying about, or at least vigourously discussing what they con-
sider a senseless wasting of life. Yet, we seldom see protest demonstrations,
rarely hear of prayers, and infrequently are involved in discussions regarding
an infinitely more senseless, and far bloodier battlefield-the nation's high-
ways. In 1967 approximately 53,100 deaths occurred as the result of motor
vehicle accidents,' whereas only 14,521 deaths were recorded in the most
fatal year of the Viet Nam war.2 The immensity of this slaughter may
become more apparent by mention of the fact that, "From 1900 through
1967, motor-vehicle deaths in the United States totalled more than 1,650,000.
United States military casualties in the principal wars from 1775 through
1967 totalled 1,118,000. Of this total 619,046 were battle deaths. . .."3
One of the most shocking results arising out of the many studies regarding
highway deaths is the concurrence that over one-half of the deaths may be
related to a motorist driving under the influence of alcohol. 4
As an example, the report of a 1964 survey of 19 California counties disclosed
that of 1,134 drivers killed in motor vehicle accidents, about 55 per cent had been
drinking prior to their accidents, and more than 46 per cent of them had 0.10
per cent or more blood alcohol concentration. Of particular significance, however,
are the figures relating to 522 of these dead drivers who were involved only in
one-car accidents. Of these, 69 per cent had been drinking and 319 of them, more
than 61 per cent, had blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 per cent or more ...
Such statistics are representative of the results of similar studies made in a number
of other parts of the country. 5
The problem is obvious; the solution is not. Thousands of lives could be
1 NATIONAL SAFETY Couxc., DIGEST OF 1968 TRAFFic ACCIDENT FACTS.
2 This is the statistic of the Department of Defense for the period from January 1,
1968 to December 28, 1968 as reported in U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 13, 1969.
at 8.
8 Supra note 1.
4 Supra note 1. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, ALCOHOL AND -IGHWAY SAFETY
REPORT 1 (1968) which reaches the same conclusion.
5 DONiGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW 1 (1966).
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saved every year if drivers would not embark on their journeys until several
hours after imbibing alcoholic beverages (the impracticality of preventing
alcoholic intake has already been adequately demonstrated in our nation's
history). The requisite self-discipline has not been indicated by our "ad-
vanced" society. Therefore the burden must be shouldered by those who lead
and represent us, our government officials, to proffer the motivation which
will prevent a motorist from operating his vehicle while he is under the in-
fluence of an intoxicating beverage. Since highways and roads are a local
concern, the state governments are necessarily the agencies to bear the re-
sponsibility. The legislatures of those states which have not acted must do
something and do it quickly. It is important, however, that the best possible
legislation to curb the traffic death rate be passed, otherwise legal complica-
tions allowing miscreants to continue their mischief will result. The best
possible legislation should be a deterrent sufficient to keep "drunken drivers
' 6
off our roads.
Swiftness, certainty, and meaningfulness comprise the requirements of a
proper deterrent. As the threat of a nuclear attack did not avert the East
Germans from building the "Berlin Wall," the possibility of a moderately
incomed individual being fined $100 at the conclusion of a long-delayed court-
room battle will not deter that individual from driving shortly after an in-
take of intoxicants. This concept appears to be the inspiration for the rash
of states promulgating "implied consent" statutes.7 The principle of "implied
consent" legislation is that a motorist gives his consent to a chemical test of
one of his bodily substances if he is arrested for driving while under the in-
fluence of alcoholic beverages; if he refuses, his license to drive is auto-
matically revoked for a specified time period. Such a test is desirable because
6 "Drunken driver" or "driving while intoxicated" are phrases which shall be used in
this paper as synonymous with the more accurately descriptive phrase of "driving while
under the influence of intoxicating liquors." The first two phrases are ordinarily an
inaccurate description of the condition which is violative of the law, however, they are
a frequently used "shorthand."
7 One-half of all states have now enacted such legislation, the majority within the last
few years: CAL. VEx. CODE § 13353 (West Supp. 1968); COL. REV. STAT. § 13-5-30
(Supp. 1967) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 14-277b (Supp. 1968) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261
(1968); HAWAi REV. LAWS § 286-151 (1968) ; IOWA CODE § 321B.3 (Supp. 1968); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.565 (Supp. 1968); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (Supp. 1968); MIcn. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(l) (1968); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 169.121 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.441 (Supp. 1968); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 39.727.03 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262-A:69-a (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:4-50.2 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. VEI. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1968);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1 (Supp. 1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1967);
Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (Page 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 751 (Supp. 1968);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.634 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-27-2.1 (Supp. 1966); S.D.
CODE § 44.0302-2 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 1188 (Supp. 1965); VA. STAT. ANN. § 18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 17C-5A-1 (Supp. 1968).
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of the difficulty of obtaining a conviction for violating the prohibition against
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors8 unless there is
scientific proof. Thus the guilty motorist must either allow the taking of evi-
dence which will render the outcome of a trial on "drunken driving" charges
virtually certain,9 or forego his driving privileges for a specified period. 10 Loss
of driving privilege may be a severe penalty in this day and age when so many
people rely upon an automobile not only for transportation but for their
economic livelihood. Thus, if properly enforced, the swift, sure, meaningful
penalty which is necessary might be embodied in "implied consent" legisla-
tion.' After indicating the constitutional justifications for "implied consent,"
the formulations for a more efficacious statute than those ordinarily pro-
mulgated shall be suggested.
BASIS OF "IMPLIED CONSENT"
In 1953 New York enacted the first "implied consent" statute.' 2 Failing
its first challenge, 13 the New York State Legislature quickly heeded the rec-
ommendations of the judiciary and enacted an "implied consent" statute
8 It is a criminal violation in every state to drive while under the influence of
intoxicating liquors or to drive while intoxicated. A State Statute to Prevent the
Operation of Motor Vehicles by Persons Under the Influence of Alcohol, 4 HARVARD
JOUrRNAL ON LEGIsLATION 280 (1967).
9 The accuracy of the tests, infra notes 73 and 76, will invariably result in conviction
when introduced in evidence, unless the testimony of the tester is impeached in some
manner.
1°Kansas, Massachusetts and New Hampshire revoke for three months; Michigan
for three to twenty-four months; Iowa for four to twelve months; California, Colorado,
Florida, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Vermont
for six months; Missouri for up to a year; Nebraska, South Dakota, and Utah for one
year; Connecticut for an indeterminate time at the discretion of the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles.
11 Of course "implied consent" legislation will not always provide the necessary
certainty to motivate inebriated drivers not to drive in that condition, because: (1) A
person may be so influenced by the alcohol he will not remember the statute or at
least be unaffected by such knowledge; and (2) in many instances even an alert police
force cannot arrest a driver influenced by intoxicants until too late, because that
influence is not physically manifested until the accident, such as by slowed reflexes, a
sudden loss of control, or a momentary-but fatal-weave into the wrong lane. However,
a substantial increase in license revocations has occurred with the introduction of
"implied consent" legislation. In 1953 there were 2,384 license revocations for "drunken
driving" in New York. In 1956, the first full year after New York's "implied consent" law
was held constitutional, there were 4,757 license revocations connected with "drunken
driving." In 1967, New York had 9,110 revocations connected with "drunken driving."
1968 ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT 113, supra note 4.
'
2 N.Y. VEH. AND TAP. LAW § 71-a (1954).
'3 Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct., Orange Co. 1954).
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which contained the revisions necessary to create a constitutionally accept-
able reform. 14 This resulted in a "Uniform Chemical Test for Intoxication
Act" which was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in July, 1957. With a few minor revisions the recom-
mendations of the above Conference were adopted by the National Committee
on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances and included in the Uniform Vehicle
Code in 1962, which has become the prototype for all other "implied consent"
legislation.'5
The rationale of "implied consent" in regard to "drunken drivers" is the
same as that of the so-called "long-arm" statutes, which provide for the
sufficiency of constructive service of process on non-residents. "Since . . .
Pawloski v. Hess ...courts generally have held that statutes providing for
constructive service of process upon users of the highways . . .are valid."'"
The underlying premise expressed long before the advent of "implied consent"
statutes is that, "The license to operate a motor vehicle was issued . . . not
as a contract, but as a mere privilege, and with the understanding that such
license may be revoked for due cause by the proper authorities."'" This con-
cept of a motorist's license being but a privilege subject to reasonable regu-
lation has been repeatedly echoed by modern-day courts in upholding such
legislation.' 8
In tandem with the "privilege concept" is the "police power concept,'
and only together does a constitutional basis emerge which is sufficient to
legitimize the concept of "implied consent" to a chemical test for intoxica-
tion or automatic revocation of license. An explicit statement supporting this
premise may be witnessed in the first Virginia case upholding that state's
"implied consent" statute:
The right to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this State is not a
property of unrestrained right, but a privilege which is subject to reasonable
regulation under the police power of the State in the interest of public safety
and welfare. 19
14 The revised statute was held constitutional in Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271,
143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct., Montgomery Co. 1955) and in all subsequent cases. See,
e.g., Bowers v. Hults, 42 Misc. 2d 845, 249 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct., Oneida Co. 1964).
1 Compare UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 6-205.1, with the statutes cited in note 7.
IOTimm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359, 362 (N.D. 1961). See DONIGAN, supra note 5, at
177-78.
17 Smith v. State, 124 Neb. 587, 590, 247 N.W. 421, 422 (1933). Accord Hadden v.
Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620, 35 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1952) ; Commonwealth v.
Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A.2d 408, 125 A.L.R. 1455 (1939) ; Nulter v. State Road Commis-
sion of West Va., 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937).
18 See Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961) ; Prucha v. Dept. of Motor
Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75, 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1961); Timm v. State, supra
note 16.
19 Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 683, 133 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1963).
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Seemingly the well-established precedent supporting the police power to
regulate against drunken drivers for the welfare of the state20 has resulted
in a paucity of challenges of "implied consent" legislation on that basis; none
of these challenges have been successful.2 1 However, many drivers convicted
of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor have contested their
conviction, if it resulted from evidence obtained through chemical tests of
their blood alcohol, on the constitutional grounds relating to self-incrimina-
tion, searches and seizures, and due process.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Since the prohibition against self-incrimination emanates from the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution, the most definitive statements
as to the extent of the privilege would naturally be found in rulings of the
United States Supreme Court. The decision in this area which has long been
the recognized authority is Holt v. United States, which held that:
[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may
be material.22
0
Recently the Court has reaffirmed this doctrine in Schmerber v. California,
which is particularly pertinent to the issue at hand. In regard to a blood
sample forcibly taken from an unwilling motorist, which was used to obtain
a conviction for "drunken driving," the Court said:
We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to
testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use
of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to their ends.23
The vast majority of lower federal court and state court decisions have ad-
hered to the doctrine enunciated in Holt and Schmerber,24 some of them
20See State v. Gallagher, 102 N.H. 335, 156 A.2d 765, 77 A.L.R.2d 1167 (1959);
Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876, 18 A.L.R.2d 537 (1958); Hertz
Drivurself Stations v. Liggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464, 7 A.L.R.2d 438 (1948).
21 DoNicAN, supra note 5, at 180.
22218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
2-3384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
24 See United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (1932); Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d
569 (1934) ; People v. Tucker, 88 Cal. App. 2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (1948) ; People v. Lewis,
152 Cal. App. 2d 824, 313 P.2d 972 (1957); State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 211 P.2d 142
(1949) ; State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945) ; State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H.
99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950); Brown v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 144, 240 S.W.2d 310 (1951);
Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 133 S.E.2d 315 (1963).
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being even more inclusive,25 and even referring specifically to chemical tests
other than a blood sample (i.e., breath, urine, and saliva which are used to
determine if a driver was intoxicated while operating his vehicle).26
Exceptions to the thesis that the Constitution forbids only testimonial
compulsion have arisen, albeit on infrequent occasions, much to the chagrin
of such experts as Wigmore, whose analysis that "it is not merely any and
every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the con-
stitutional definition, but testimonial compulsion, '27 is frequently cited. A
well-known case in Texas, Apodaca v. State, not only ruled that the uri-
nalysis violated the privilege against self-incrimination, but even a non-
chemical test whereby the defendant was unable to place his finger to his
nose was inadmissible "as obnoxious to the immunity guaranteed by the Con-
stitution .... ,28 Although this doctrine was not adopted by the majority of
the Supreme Court, Justices Warren and Fortas did dissent in Schmerber
on the basis that forcing one to submit to a blood test violates the privilege
of self-incrimination. 29
A different rationale for holding chemical tests of blood alcohol inadmis-
sible may be discerned in Justice Black's dissent in Schmerber. Without
altering the historical conception of the scope of the privilege, Justice Black
was able to find that blo6d tests violate the privilege, by finding that they
were of a testimonial and communicative nature:
It seems to me that the compulsory extraction of petitioner's blood for analysis
so that the person who analyzed it could give evidence to convict him had both
a "testimonial" and a "communicative nature." The sole purpose of this project
...was to obtain "testimony" from some person to prove that petitioner had
alcohol in his blood at the time he was arrested. And the purpose of the project
was certainly "communicative" in that the analysis of the blood was to supply
25 United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758, 762 (D.C., 1954): "The law is clear ...
that the privilege against self-incrimination is limited to the giving of oral testimony ....
The conclusion is inevitable that it does not bar the use of secretions of the defendant's
body and the introduction of their chemical analysis in evidence." State v. Oleson, 180 Neb.
546, 550, 43 N.W.2d 912, 920 (1966): "The privilege against self-incrimination . . . does
not extend to defendant's body, nor to secretions therefrom nor to the introduction of
the chemical analysis in evidence."
26 See State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953) (breath test); Ridgell v. United
States, 54 A.2d 679 (Ct. of Appeals D.C., 1947) (urine test) ; State v. Blair, 45 N.J. 43,
211 A.2d 196 (1965) (breath test); State v. Titak, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 430, 144 N.E.2d 255
(1955) (breath test).
27 8 WIGMORE, EViDENCE 2263 (McNaughton revision, 1961).
28 Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 595, 146 S.W.2d 381, 382 (1940).
29 Supra note 23, dissents of Warren and Fortas. See also Cox v. State, 395 P.2d 954
(Okla. Crim, 1964) which held chemical tests inadmissible as violating the uniquely
worded self-incrimination prohibition in the Oklahoma Bill of Rights.
[Vol. XVIII
LEGISLATION NOTE
information to enable a witness to communicate to the court and jury that peti-
tioner was more or less drunk.30
Another line of reasoning was evidenced by a New York court which held
that the defendant's constitutional protections extended to excluding the
results of chemical tests admitted in evidence in a criminal proceeding, but
not at a civil proceeding, which is what the "implied consent" law provided
for.3 ' Although this is an interesting thesis insofar as it delineates between
the "crime" of driving while intoxicated and the loss of driving privilege
because of performing the same offense, there is little validity in the dis-
tinction-a distinction which has met courtroom approval in that same
state.32 The implications of a Supreme Court ruling, Boyd v. United States,
denies the ability to delineate between criminal and noncriminal proceedings
of this type which would obliterate constitutional protections in the latter
instances:
As . . .suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses
against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within
the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment ...and of that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... . 3
Thus the same constitutional protections are to be found in criminal and
quasi-criminal proceedings.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons ...against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures . . . ," granted by amendment five, applies to
all the states as well as the federal government; and the "exclusionary rule, 3 4
is equally applicable.3 5 The scope of this privilege is a concommitant to de-
ciding the constitutionality of "implied consent" legislation, for if such legis-
lation allows for unreasonable searches and seizures of the person, the evi-
dence could not be used to penalize drunken drivers.
There are a number of recurrent problems involved with determining the
constitutionality of obtaining a chemical sample of a bodily substance from
a suspected drunken driver. The idea that no search or seizure is taking place
30 Supra note 23, at 774.
31 Combes v. Kelly, 2 Misc. 2d 491, 152 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1956).
32 Supra note 14.
33 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
34 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) which enunciates this doctrine.
3SMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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at all has been adequately disposed of by present case law.3 6 But whether
the test was properly taken in all of its aspects is a frequently controverted
problem.
If express consent is obtained for the taking of a bodily chemical substance
subsequent to a lawful arrest, the evidence is properly taken.3 7 If express
consent is denied, "implied consent" legislation provides that no test may be
taken.38 A problem arises, however, in regard to blood samples taken from
unconscious suspects, or those in such a physical condition that they have
no ability to consent, deny, or physically resist the taking of the sample. The
leading case on this problem is Breithaupt v. Abram which held:
There is nothing "brutal" or "offensive" in the taking of a sample of blood when
done, as in this case, under the protective eye of a physician. To be sure, the
driver here was unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of con-
scious consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation
of a constitutional right.3 9
Breithaupt, has led to some "implied consent" statutes including a provision
that a blood sample may be taken from a person in an unconcious state and
be admitted into evidence in a criminal trial for driving while intoxicated. 40
Breithaupt also indicates the test should be supervised by a physician to be
properly taken. Provisions to this effect are also a requisite part of properly
formulated "implied consent" legislation.
No search and seizure without a search warrant can be reasonable unless:
36 See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Schmerber v. California, supra
note 23; State v. Johnson, 135 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1965) ; State v. Kroenig, 274 Wis.
266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956). This theory has been given some support, however, in
regard to breath tests. Because breathing is a natural function and no penetration of the
body occurs in gathering the sample, it was thought that the capturing of the atmosphere
would not be within the scope of the privilege. See State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261
(1953). See also 32 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 250 (1954).
37 See People v. Taylor, 152 Cal. App. 2d 29, 312 P.2d 731 (1957) ; McRae v. People,
131 Colo. 492, 286 P.2d 618 (1955) ; State v. Wardlaw, 107 So. 2d 179 (Fla. App. 1958) ;
State v. Bailey, 184 Kan. 704, 339 P.2d 45 (1959) ; Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806, 77
N.W.2d 592 (1956); Commonwealth v. Mummert, 183 Pa. Super. 638, 133 A.2d 301
(1957); State v. Bryan, 16 Utah 2d 47, 395 P.2d 539 (1964) ; Caldwell v. Commonwealth,
205 Va. 277, 136 S.E.2d 798 (1964).
38 This may be more a legislative response to the due process implications of Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), than of legislative fear of violating the fourth amend-
ment.
9 Breithaupt, supra note 36, at 435.
40 California, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Ohio are the states
which have specifically incorporated this provision. Only North Dakota, however, has
specifically stated that an unconscious person is deemed to have withdrawn consent. Two
state courts have disagreed with this contention; State v. Withal, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W.
148 (1940), which was prior to Breithaupt, and Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93
N.W.2d 281 (1958) which was after Breithaupt, but prior to the recently enacted "implied
consent" statute in Michigan.
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(1) There is probable cause for the arrest, and (2) it is incident to a legal
arrest.41 What is probable cause? What is a search incident to an arrest?
Neither question can be answered definitively; both are subject to factual
situations, for "[t]he real criteria as to the reasonableness of a search is
whether or not . . . under the facts, the police officer has reasonable grounds
to believe that defendants may have committed a felony. ' 42 The implications
of this may be greater than first anticipated. One North Dakota case held
that the acquittal of a motorist suspected of drunken driving meant his arrest
was illegal, and thus his license could not be revoked for his refusal to sub-
mit to a chemical test of his bodily substances. 43 An almost automatic cat-
egorization of an arrest as illegal, which precludes a civil proceeding to revoke
a driver's license, because it is difficult to prove intoxication beyond a rea-
sonable doubt without scientific verification of the arresting officer's testi-
mony, would effectively nullify "implied consent" statutes. As yet, however,
no other court has abided by the reasoning of this North Dakota decision.
The factual situations regarding the question of what is incident to an
arrest are equally elusive as far as defining a mold in which everything will
fit. "[W]here probable cause exists to arrest the driver without warrant, the
fact that the search preceded the arrest is immaterial." 44 However, how long
before the arrest may the search occur-ten minutes, one hour, two hours,
twelve hours, a day, a week, a few weeks? Unfortunately the cases do not
answer this question.
45
DUE PROCESS
Due process of law has been defined as notice and opportunity to be
heard. 46 Thus, to comply with the fourteenth amendment, a prompt hearing
must be had to decide whether or not a refusal to submit to the extraction of
a bodily substance should result in loss of license. The "implied consent"
41 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383; Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198,
216 A.2d 50 (1966).
42 People v. Soto, 144 Cal. App. 2d 294, 298, 301 P.2d 45, 48 (1956). See Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952 (C.C.A.
Tex. 1946).
43 Coiling v. Hjelle, 125 N.W.2d 453 (N.D. 1963).
44State v. Kroenig, supra note 36, at 273, 79 N.W.2d at 815. Accord, People v.
Duroncelay, 47 Cal. 2d 266, 312 P.2d 690 (1957) ; People v. Pack, 179 Cal. App. 2d 857,
19 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1962). See also Bournas v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 656, 112 S.E.2d 88
(1960).
45 People v. Knox, 178 Cal. App. 2d 502, 3 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1960) (nine day lapse
too long) ; State v. Wolf, 164 A.2d 865 (Del. 1960) (two weeks lapse too long) ; People
v. Young, 42 Misc. 2d 540, 248 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1964) (over one year lapse too long);
State v. Kroenig, supra note 36 (nine day lapse too long).
46 Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 140 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 1966).
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logic was held unconstitutional in its first challenge because "there [was] no
provision entitling the licensee to an ultimate hearing upon an adequate
record before the final taking away of his license."'47 Subsequent legislation
has adhered to this doctrine. There is a diversity of opinion, however, as to
whether the hearing must precede the revocation. Whereas some courts have
upheld statutes which do not require a hearing first,4 8 many other courts
have ruled the opposite.
49
Another due process problem which frequently arises concerns the ability
of the defendant to obtain a chemical test independent of that conducted by
the legislative enforcers. Although it has been said that:
"Due process of law is another name for governmental fair play" [citation
omitted]. Fair play requires . . . a respondent charged with operation of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ...to a reasonable
opportunity to attempt to procure the seasonable taking of a blood sample for
test purposes.50 To refuse him such reasonable opportunity is to deny him the
only opportunity he has to defend himself against the charge.5 '
It is still a litigated point as to what constitutes a "reasonable opportunity."
Although all "implied consent" statutes provide for such "reasonable oppor-
tunity ' 52 a recent decision said, "We do not read the statute to require the
police to advise the defendant of his right to take such a test. The right in
question on appeal is a statutory and not a constitutional right."'W Though
being advised of the right to take a test is considered a statutory right as yet,
and only a few states have such a statute,5 4 application of Miranda v. Ar-
izona55 will increase the number of people who will exercise their prerogative.
The consequence of the police informing a person of his immediate right to
an attorney will inevitably lead to many clients being promptly counseled of
47Supra note 13, at 54, 127 N.V.S.2d at 128.
48 Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967); Drasin v. Kelly, 6 A.D. 2d 453,
179 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1958) ; People v. Benzel, 10 Misc. 2d 963, 173 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1958);
Law v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 449, 199 S.E. 516 (1938); State v. Stehlek, 262 Wis.
642, 56 N.W.2d 514 (1953).
4 9 See State v. Moseng, 95 N.W.2d 6 (Minn. 1959); Parsekian v. Cresse, 75 N.J.
Super. 405, 183 A.2d 426 (1962) ; Cathy v. State, 402 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. 1966).
50 State v. Munsey, 152 Me. 198, 201, 127 A.2d 79, 81 (1956).
51 In re Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 866, 1 Cal. Rptr. 80, 83 (1959). Accord,
People v. Dawson, 184 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 881, 7 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1960).
52 Supra note 7.
5 3People v. Kerrigan, 8 Mich. App. 216, 219, 154 N.W.2d 43, 45 (1967). See People
v. Church, 5 Mich. App. 303, 146 N.W.2d 714 (1966); Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 205
Va. 277, 136 S.E.2d 798 (1964).
54N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 (1968 Supp.); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-27-3 (1969); VA. CODE
§ 18-55 (1960) (repealed 1964).
55384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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their right to obtain an independent chemical test, whereas pre-Miranda de-
fendants may not have contacted an attorney until it was too late to obtain
an auxiliary test.
What happens, however, if the defendant is unable to obtain an indepen-
dent test? As yet no case has been dismissed on the basis of this contention
as long as the police afforded the defendant some opportunity to obtain the
test, such as allowing a call, 56 or going to a nearby hospital if the doctor
called was not available to take the test within the limited time after the arrest
in which a valid test result could be achieved. 57 The rationale that, "If all
reasonable efforts fail and no blood sample is in fact procured, no rights of
the respondent are infringed, for his right is not to have a test sample taken
but only to have a reasonable opportunity to attempt to gather the desired
evidence,"' 8 has received firm support.59 Although reasonableness is always a
factual question, if "implied consent" legislation was to encompass proper
guidelines on the issue there could undoubtedly be fewer courtroom chal-
lenges.
Another attack on the due process aspects of "implied consent" legislation
concerns the apparent violation of immunity from double jeopardy, a protec-
tion now applicable to the states.60 Loss of license due to refusal to allow
blood-alcohol tests and the criminal prosecution which will still ensue seems
to be a double penal proceeding for the same offense. However this question
is adequately disposed of by the reasoning of Atkinson v. Parsekian which
stated:
It is well settled that the Legislature has the constitutional power to impose both
a criminal and civil or administrative sanction in respect to the same act or
omission [citation omitted]. The double jeopardy clause merely prohibits at-
tempting a second time to punish criminally for the same offense. The proceedings
before the Director ...are administrative and not criminal. . . .Although the
suspension or revocation of a driver's license . . . may appear to be punishment
to the wrongdoer. .... (1
56 People v. Dawson, supra note 51; In re Newbern, supra note 51.
57 See In re Howard, 208 Cal. App. 2d 709, 25 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1962).
58 Supra note 50, at 201-2, 127 A.2d at 82.
59 Accord In re Koehne, 54 Cal. 2d 757, 8 Cal. Rptr. 435, 356 P.2d 179 (1960)
Starret v. Midwest City, 374 P.2d 777 (Okla. Crim. 1962); Winston v. Commonwealth,
188 Va. 386, 49 S.E.2d 611 (1948).
6 0 Benton v. Maryland, 37 U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. Sup. Ct. June 23, 1969).
61 37 N.J. 143, 154-5, 179 A.2d 732, 738, 96 A.L.R.2d 602, 610 (1962). See Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1937) ; Hough v. McCarthy, 54 Cal. 2d 273, 5 Cal. Rptr. 668, 353
P.2d 276 (1960); Anderson v. Comm'r of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 126 N.W.2d 778
(1964) ; David v. Strelecki, 97 N.J. Super. 360, 235 A.2d 195 (1967) ; Commonwealth v.
Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (1936).
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CHEMICAL TESTS AND THEIR VALIDITY
Although one may concede that legislation must be enacted to motivate
motorists not to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, and
that properly drafted "implied consent" legislation is constitutional, it still
must be determined what value a statute serves by requiring chemical tests
of the bodily substances of a suspected violator. If the test results are not
admissible in court because they are held irrelevant, or the weight of the
evidence is slight because the tests are not considered scientifically accurate,
then clearly the alternatives offered in "implied consent" statutes would not
be viable. In the early stages of the development of such chemical tests both
these matters were in controversy. However, the controversy seems to be
settled now in favor of the reliability of chemical tests to indicate that a
person is under the influence of intoxicants:
It is today agreed by most experts that the blood alcohol content, that is, the
amount of the alcohol in the blood, bears a fairly constant relationship with the
alcohol in the brain. Since it is the alcohol in the brain . . . that directly causes
most of the physical and psychological effects attributable to the presence of
alcohol in the body, there is general accord that the blood alcohol content
accurately reflects the degree of alcoholic influence.62
Conclusions of numerous tests by scientists around the world were com-
piled to determine exactly what blood alcohol levels indicated that a person's
brain was influenced by his alcoholic intake.63 Initial results led to a
recommendation by the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and
Ordinances, which was adopted by the Uniform Vehicle Code.64 With better
testing procedures, however, most of the authorities revamped their estimates
of the level of impairment. "Accordingly, in 1962, the National Committee on
Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances recommended this change by revision
of section 11-902(b) of the Uniform Vehicle Code."' ' 5 Most states have
adopted the original statutory presumptions of the Uniform Vehicle Code;66
62 6 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, Intoxication 465, 494 (1968). See supra note 5, at 19:
"No court has reversed a case on the ground that chemical tests are not valid for the
purpose of determining alcoholic influence."
03Supra note 5, at 20-23.
64 UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 54(b) (1949 version).
65Supra note 5, at 23.
66 Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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a few states have adopted the presumptive levels established in 1962.67 Such
legislative enactment has eliminated, the discretionary element as to admis-
sibility of evidence indicating the percentage of alcohol in the blood stream,
and thus chemical tests and their results are made admissible by statute in
most states.6s
Admissibility of the test results has not created as great a problem as has
the question of the reliability of the chemical tests. Although "chemical tests
by experts of body fluids.. . have been approved as having gained that scien-
tific recognition for infallibility as to be admissible in evidence, "69 it is rec-
ognized that, "[m] ost unbiased experts agree there are many possible sources
of error in testing blood alcohol content chemically .... ,70 These errors must
be avoided, for a skillful defense attorney will readily reduce the weight of
such tests to nil if for any reason the test may not have been accurately
performed.
71
DIRECT BLOOD ANALYSIS
It has been held that "such tests are generally accepted by the medical
profession, courts and legislative bodies as reliable, with a direct analysis
of the blood, as was here present, being considered the most dependable
method."17 2 Being that direct blood analysis is considered the most reliable?a
a majority of states specifically provide for such tests, whereas only two
states specifically exclude them.7 4 However, there is some evidence indicating
that even a properly performed blood test, by an accredited physician, an-
alyzed in a properly equipped laboratory by an experienced technician is not
completely reliable as an indicator of the alcohol content of the brain, because
it is venous blood which is ordinarily taken, and arterial blood is the blood
which goes to the brain.75
67 Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, and Vermont.
0S Alabama, Alaska, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas are the only states without
statutes authorizing the admissibility of chemical tests.
6 9 Toms v. State, 234 P.2d 812, 822 (Okla. Crim. 1952).
70 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTS, supra note 62, at 300. Many of these sources of errors
will be discussed in the ensuing pages.
71See ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES CRIMINAL-CIVIL (2d ed. 1966).
See also DONIGAN, supra note 63, and Watts, Some Observations on Police-Administered
Tests for Intoxication, 45 N.C.L. REV. 434 (1966).
7 2 People v. Adams, 25 Ill. 2d 568, 573-74, 185 N.E.2d 676, 679-80 (1962).
73 See 59 J. CRnI. L. C. & P. S. 57 (1968) ; Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, supra note 62,;
ERWIN, supra note 71; Watts, supra note 71; DONIGAN, supra note 63.
74 Pennsylvania and North Carolina.
75 AsMr. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, supra note 62, at 497.
1969]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
BREATH TESTS
Indirect testing of the blood alcohol by breath tests is a method which
has increasingly gained acceptance.701 "The principle breath testing instru-
ments in use today . . . all utilize the basic principle that the concentration of
alcohol in the pulmonary blood is proportional to its concentration in the air
deep within the lungs [alveolar air]. The foremost machine to perform
this test is the "breathalyzer." 7 " 'The breathalyzer is probably the best of
the breath methods for determining blood alcohol in that the measuring de-
vice for determining the volume of air tested is very well engineered and ap-
pears to be quite accurate.' It is also the simplest. 781 An indication of how
accurate the breathalyzer is may be imputed from a 1953 study by the Na-
tional Safety Council which was conducted long before the advanced breath-
alyzer went into operation. The study found that the Intoximeter differed
from direct blood analysis made at the same time by only 0.008 per cent;
the Alcometer and Drunkometer deviated by about 0.010 per cent.79 Results
of breath tests have been held sufficient for a conviction of driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.80 Also indicative of the high regard accredited
such instruments as the breathalyzer is the fact that several states have pro-
mulgated legislation which provides only for the use of a breath test; no
other chemical test need be used.81
However, proper administering of a test in the manner necessary to meet
all the ordinary restrictions and requirements82 may still lead to an erroneous
result for a variety of reasons. "[F]or example, if the stomach contains a
large concentration of alcohol from a recent drink, 'burping, belching, or
hiccoughing can give high and usually erratic readings ... 8,' 3 which will
of course negate its value as courtroom evidence.
76State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 170, 199 A.2d 809, 822 (1964), "Various devices
[breath testers] are now in common use . . . . All are now generally scientifically
recognized as sufficiently reliable." Watts, supra note 71, at 55, "I believe that in
the United States today breath tests are both more precise and more accurate in
indicating blood-alcohol level than most blood and urine tests performed on criminal
defendants."
77 Am. JUR. PROOF oF FACTS, supra note 62, at 497. For a good discussion as to the
scientific aspect of formulating the ratio and the problems in determining its accuracy,
see ERWIN, supra note 71 at 358-364 (§ 16.02) and Watts, supra note 71.
78 J. CRnI. L., supra note 73, at 59.
7 9 Am. JuR. PROOF oF FACTS, supra note 62, at 560.
8 OPeople v. Haehnel, 78 Ill. App. 2d 81, 223 N.E.2d 464 (1966).
81 Pennsylvania and North Carolina rely exclusively on them and Senate Bill 17
introduced January 8, 1969 by Senators Arrington, Coulson and Harris proposes an
"implied consent" law for Illinois in which a breath test is the sole means of obtaining
a chemical sample.
82 Infra note 92.
8a j. CRno. L., supra note 73, at 61.
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URINE AND SALIVA TESTS
Possibilities of erroneous test results are even more likely in the chemical
tests of the other body substances, urine and saliva, which have been found to
be correlative with blood alcohol level.8 4 The rare instances in which these
tests are used do not warrant a prolonged explanation as to the complexities
involved in the testing procedure which lends itself to so many flaws. Suffice
it to say that if there is any possibility of contamination in the mouth, or any
possibility there is urine in the bladder from a previous and irrelevant intake
of intoxicants, the test result will be of no evidentiary value when the defense
is conducted by a skilled attorney.8 5
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO DIMINISH THE PROBLEM
Mere recital of the aspects of "implied consent" legislation which indicate
its legitimacy as a proper means of penalizing a dangerous element in our
society is insufficient to motivate one to support passage of such legislation.
But it is difficult as yet to indicate the imperatives of "implied consent"
because correlative statistics linking "implied consent" legislation with a
decline in traffic fatalities resulting from drivers under the influence of in-
toxicating liquors has not been tabulated in this country. A survey of the
amount of traffic fatalities in a state before and after the passage of this type
of legislation leads to no definitive result, for it does not take into considera-
tion road mileage for the year, the increase in drivers, highway conditions, and
highly important enforcement policy. However,
[a] dramatic drop in traffic accidents and deaths in [Great Britain] is seen
as conclusive proof in London of the success of Britain's new compulsory breath-
alyzer test. During a five-day period over Christmas, road deaths fell throughout
Britain by 40 per cent-from 158 in 1966 to 98 in the same period of 1967. The
number of traffic accidents fell by 25 per cent during that period. . . . Also,
traffic injuries decreased by nearly 30 per cent .... 86
In the first year of this law, which gives police the authority to test the
breath of anyone driving erratically, serious injuries on the roads fell eleven
per cent and deaths by fourteen per cent. s7 Such results, in conjunction with
cognizance of this menace to society's well-being, has led the insurance
industry in Illinois to contemplate lobbying for a similar bill. Allstate In-
surance Company has already begun an advertising campaign to spur the
public into supporting an "implied consent" statute.
84 Am. JUa. PROOF oF FACTS, supra note 62, at 496.
85 See ERWIN, supra note 71, at 569-77 (§§ 22.01 & 22.02).
86 U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 8, 1968, at 9.
87 Chicago Sun Times, Dec. 16, 1968, at 27, col. 3.
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The prototype for the "implied consent" statutes now in force is the Uni-
form Vehicle Code, which has remained substantially intact in its promulga-
tion by the twenty-nine states having such legislation. Although it forms a
viable basis for future legislation, it is not presently in the most efficacious
form for rendering the desired deterrent. The remainder of this paper shall
contemplate ideas which might enhance certitude of punishment. For the
purpose of fuller comprehension, paraphrasing of appropriate sections of the
Uniform Vehicle Code will precede the discussion of possible changes.
Section 6-205.1:
(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this
state shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of his
blood, breath, urine, or saliva. The test or tests shall be at the direction of a law
enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the driver was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. The law enforcement agency shall designate
which of the tests will be administered.
To insure the greatest possible dissemination of the law the consent should
be explicit as well as implied. Whenever a resident applies for a license, or
renewal of one previously issued, he should be required to sign a paper which
states that he consents to a chemical test for the determination of his blood
alcohol, and that a refusal to consent to a test made incident to his lawful
arrest will result in suspension of his license for six months. Signing this
paper will not only make drivers aware of the penalty, but will make the
possibility of a successful courtroom challenge of this aspect of the legisla-
tion even more remote.8 8 Non-resident motorists still could only be covered
by the law as an "implied consent" bill, but billboards pertaining to this fact
could be erected on all highways entering the state.
An.aspect of this section which should be maintained, but has been altered
by a number of states,89 is the requirement that consent be to tests of any
and all the bodily substances. If only one test is administered, the problem
of an erroneous result is magnified. Also, in the states which require only the
breath test, there is the possibility that areas of the state may lack the equip-
ment or personnel to administer such a test at all required moments.90
88 See A State Statute to Prevent the Operation of Motor Vehicles by Persons Under the
Influence of Alcohol, 4 HARV. J. LEGIS. 280, 293-94 for a discussion of the problems
which may occur if this innovation of express consent is incorporated into "implied
consent" legislation.
89 Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia are the states
with "implied consent" which specifically exempt one or more of the tests from being
given.
00 The Chicago Police Department trains specialists in administering breathalyzer tests
for 40 hours at the University of Indiana. The Illinois State Police train specialists for
40 hours at their training 'academy in Springfield. Each of those departments has the
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To help obviate the problem of an erroneous breath test it may be wise to
incorporate the requirements set by a Washington court for finding a breath-
alyzer test admissible as prima facie evidence of intoxication, to wit:
(1) [T]hat the machine was properly checked and in proper working order at the
time of conducting the test; (2) that the chemicals employed were of the correct
kind and compounded in the proper proportions; (3) that the subject had nothing
in his mouth at the time of the test and that he had taken no food or drink
within fifteen minutes prior to taking the test; (4) that the test be given by a
qualified operator and in the proper manner ..."I
It has been recognized that "unless the above four requirements are satis-
fied, the result of the test is wholly unreliable. '92 But even if these require-
ments are adhered to, there is no absolute guarantee the test will be accurate.
As previously noted, hiccoughing or belching will cause the test to go awry,93
as will recent use of a mouthwash. Also, since a breath test depends upon the
use of the air deep within the lungs, it is conceivable that a motorist osten-
sibly "consenting" would not summon forth the requisite air, thus registering
at a level below the presumption levels necessary to obtain a conviction.
Due to the aforementioned problems of inaccurate tests and inadequate
testing facilties and personnel, it seems advisable for the police to perform
two chemical tests on every person arrested for driving while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquors. Two different tests are preferable, for the cor-
relation of the two will forge a strong link in the chain of evidence. Use of the
direct blood test, which is the most precise test when properly administered,94
may also ameliorate the difficulties of the rural area police force. With a
properly identified blood sample, which is mailed to and tested by a qualified
laboratory technician, the necessary evidence can be readily used by police
forces lacking the specialist necessary for taking breath tests, but which has
a doctor or nurse available. For those who justifiably object to a blood test
for medical or religious reasons, a urine or saliva test may be used. Although
it is not recommended to use a urine or saliva test alone to prove one, guilty
of "drunken driving," it is a proper supplement to the breath test.
resources to purchase the latest equipment, and the manpower to replace a technician
who leaves the force. But what about rural police forces which ordinarily lack the
resources and the professionalism of the two largest enforcement agencies in the State?
It seems highly doubtful that even if all communities obtained a breathalyzer, or
similar machine, they could maintain trained personnel all day every day of the year,
capable of conforming to the four requirements set forth in the text at note 92.
91 State v. Baker, 56 Wash. 2d 846, 852, 355 P.2d 806, 809-10 (1960).
92 Id. at 852, 355 P.2d at 810.
93 J. CRrM. L., supra note 73, at 61.
94 J. CRIM. L., supra note 73; Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, supra note 62; ERWIN, supra
note 71; Watts, supra note 71; DONIGAN, supra nocte 63.
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(b) Any person who is dead, unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusal, shall
be deemed not to have withdrawn consent, and the tests may be given.
Presently this provision is constitutional, for the circumstances described
have, in essence, been approved by the majority in Breithaupt and Schmer-
ber. Possibly because of the dissent in those cases the vast majority of states
with "implied consent" laws have not adopted this section. 5 However, for
the reasons enunciated in Breithaupt, it is advisable that legislation include
testing those who cannot deny consent:
As against the right of an individual that his person be held inviolable . . . must
be set the interests of society in the scientific determination of intoxication, one
of the great mortal hazards of the roads. And the more so since the test likewise
may establish innocence, thus affording protection against the treachery of
judgment based on one or more of the senses. Furthermore . . . the individual's
right to immunity from such invasion of the body . . . is far outweighed by
the value of its deterrent effect .... 96
(c) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to chemical tests none shall be
given, but upon receipt by the appropriate official of a sworn report of the law
enforcement officer that he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person
had been driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and that the
person had refused to submit to the tests, the license to drive shall be revoked.
The procedure outlined by this section does not sufficiently protect the
suspect. No provision is made for the driver to be informed of his rights.
Revocations in instances where the person thus deprived had no knowledge
of the consequences of a refusal has met courtroom approval, 97 but this type
of procedure is fraught with serious due process questions, which can only
be obviated by a specific, mandatory statute in which the accused is: in-
formed of his right to have a chemical test taken under the direction of a
law enforcement officer, informed of the consequences of refusal, and pos-
sibly informed of the Miranda warnings. As yet, the courts which have con-
sidered this last possibility have ruled that an arrestee does not have the
right to legal advice as to whether he should submit to the test or not98 nor
are the other Miranda warnings applicable. 99 However, until the United
05 California, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Ohio are the only
states which have adopted this provision in their "implied consent" statute.
96 Supra note 36, at 439-40. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
07 Hazlett v. Motor Vehicle Department, State Highway Comm'r., 195 Kan. 439, 407 P.2d
551 (1965); Prucha v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra note 18; Anderson v. MacDuff,
supra note 14; Timm v. State, supra note 16.
98 See State v. Oleson, 180 Neb. 546, 143 N.W.2d 917 (1966); Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11
N.Y.2d 58, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403, 181 N.E.2d 427 (1962); Gottschalk v. Suppel, 140 N.W.2d
866 (Iowa 1966).
99 State v. Kenderski, 99 N.J. Super. 224, 239 A.2d 249 (1968). See Watts, supra note
71, at 113-16, for a discussion of the applicability of Miranda.
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States Supreme Court is afforded the opportunity to pass upon these matters,
it cannot be definitely stated that they are not a due process requirement.
Furthermore, the Code provides for a deprivation of a person's license
without an opportunity to be heard. Although there are cases in which it has
been held that a hearing is not a condition precedent to suspension of a
license,100 many other cases indicate it to be so,'"' regardless of the fact
that a license is a privilege and not a right. Thus to insure that due process
is adhered to, it is advisable that a procedure be established whereby: (1)
the driver is given notice that he will have his license suspended in five days
if he does not contest the officer's sworn statement of the facts; (2) the driver
has five days within which to formulate a written request for an administra-
tive hearing; (3) within ten days a hearing shall be afforded; (4) within ten
days after an adverse ruling the driver may petition for a judicial hearing;
(5) a judicial hearing will be granted within thirty days; and (6) if the
ruling is still adverse the license will be suspended or revoked. To do other-
wise would be to punish a person before proving his guilt, rather than fol-
lowing the revered policy of "innocent until proven guilty."
(d) Upon the written request of a person whose privilege had been denied, the
appropriate official shall grant the person an opportunity to be heard. The scope
of the hearing shall cover the issues of whether a law enforcement officer had
reasonable ground to believe the person had been driving or was in actual
physical control of a vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, whether the person was placed under arrest and whether
he refused to submit to the test. Whether the person was informed that his
privilege to drive would be revoked if he refused to submit shall not be an issue.
The appropriate official shall order either that the revocation be rescinded or
sustained.
The scope of the hearing must be expanded to prevent rather arbitrary
results. What if the driver knew that for some reason his test result would
not be accurate? What if he is a hemophiliac and the police are only equipped
for a blood test? What if submitting to the test would violate his religious
beliefs? A multitude of other factors may be conceived of (which can be
termed mitigating factors) for refusing to submit to a chemical test. If a re-
cital of mitigating factors is not allowed in evidence how can it be said that a
"fair" hearing was granted? Also, as previously intimated, another issue
100 Campbell v. Chatwin, 102 Ariz. 251, 428 P.2d 108 (1967); Jones v. Kirkman, 138
So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1962) ; Adams v. Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46 (Idaho 1966) ; State v. Finley, 198
Kan. 585, 426 P.2d 251 (1967); State ex. rel. Reilston v. State Dept. of Licenses, 60
Wash. 2d 535, 374 P.2d 571 (1962); Garford Trucking v. Hoffman, 114 N.J.L. 522, 177
A. 882 (1935) ; Nulter v. State Road Comm'r., 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937);
State v. Stehlek, supra note 48.
101 Ratliff v. Lampton, 32 Cal. 2d 226, 195 P.2d 792 (1948) ; State v. Moseng, supra
note 49; Cathy v. State, 402 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. 1966) Texas Dept. of Public
Safety v. Hamilton, 304 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. 1957).
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should be based upon a consideration of whether the person was informed
that his privilege to drive would be revoked if he refused to submit to the
test. In certain instances it may very well be as natural a reaction for an in-
nocent person to refuse a blood or urine test, or even a breath or saliva test,
as it is for a person guilty of driving while intoxicated. However, upon learn-
ing the consequences the innocent person may relent in his refusal; not al-
lowing this opportunity appears to be a perversion of justice.
(e) If the revocation is sustained, the person whose license has been revoked
may file a petition for a judicial hearing. No evidence additional to that in the
administrative hearing may be heard. The court shall affirmi unless it finds
the evidence insufficient to warrant the conclusion reached.
This section needs no revision except as apropos to the previous section,
for here also the court should hear recitation of any mitigating factors as to
why a license should not be revoked for the driver's refusal to submit to a
test.
Section 11-902:
(b) In any civil or criminal proceeding for a violation relating to driving a vehicle
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's
blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance shall give rise to the following
presumptions.
1. If there was 0.05 per cent or less by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood,
it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating
liquor;
2. If there was an excess of 0.05 but less than 0.10 per cent by weight of alcohol
in the defendant's blood, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption that the
defendant was or was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact
may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant;
3. If there was 0.10 per cent or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's
blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor;
4. The foregoing provisions shall not be construed as limiting the introduction
of any other competent evidence bearing on the question.
These new statutory presumptions, which substitute the figure 0.10 per
cent in place of 0.15 per cent, are a useful adjunct for fulfilling the deterrent
aspirations of "implied consent" proponents, for then imbibers should be even
more wary of alcohol intake before driving. Thus it is recommended that
these presumptions not only be incorporated into new legislation, but sup-
plant legislation with the old presumptions.
(c) Chemical analysis shall only be valid if performed according to methods
approved by the State Department of Health and by an individual ascertained as
competent to administer the tests.
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(d) When a person submits to a blood test only a physician, nurse, or other
qualified person may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining alcoholic
content.
(e) The person tested may have a qualified person of his own choosing administer
a chemical test or tests in addition to those administered at the direction of the
law enforcement officer. The failure or inability to obtain an additional test
by a person shall not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the tests
taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer.
The lack of specificity regarding the procedure afforded a person desiring
additional tests may be a pernicious vagueness-a right without an oppor-
tunity to exercise that right is purely an illusory right. The police may easily
keep an arrestee in the police station during the entire time in which a chem-
ical sample would be relevant to the blood alcohol at the time of arrest. Thus,
clear provision should be made for the arrestee to make as many phone calls
as are required to obtain a qualified person of his choice to take chemical
tests. If it cannot be arranged to have a qualified person come to the jail,
and the law enforcement officers intend to keep the prisoner beyond the time
-span in which a relevant test may be taken, the prisoner, at his request,
should be taken to the nearest hospital or doctor available for the test to be
conducted.
An additional section, of which there is no mention in the Uniform Vehicle
Code should be proposed to deal with those who are caught more than once
recklessly endangering the lives of our citizens by driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. A motorist who twice loses his license subsequent to
the provisions and procedures of "implied consent" legislation should be
fined $500 to $5,000 and lose his license for one to two years upon the second
revocation, for obviously, if there is any deterrent to such a driver, a six
month suspension of his driving privilege is an insufficient one. Also, a mo-
torist whose license is suspended pursuant to an "implied consent" law and
who violates the sanction imposed should undergo the same penalty as the
repeating offender. Vigilant law enforcement would be required to make this
latter proposal effective, since periodic checks would be necessary to see if
the automobile of the offending motorist is in use, and, if so, by whom. How-
ever, for those who may argue the practicality of such a procedure, it must
be remembered that if there are far fewer dangerous drivers on the road, law
enforcement officers will be spending much less time at the scene of accidents
and will have more time for such preventive measures. An alternative plan
may be for the Secretary of State, or other appropriate officials, to hire special
investigators whose function would be to make the needed inspections. Vi-
gorous enforcement of "implied consent" would do much to enhance its de-
terrent value, and the effect of public cognizance of such enforcement might
far surpass the extra expenditure necessary for implementation.
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CONCLUSION
It is hoped that legislators nationwide will harken to proposals such as
those expounded by the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and
Ordinances, as herein expressed, or by any other authoritative source or per-
tinent academic work.
As a nation we have become so inured to the tragedies on our highways
that our attention is addressed only to the more dramatic events of our day.
But this cannot continue!
We are steadily increasing the extent of our motorized mobility; yet
twenty-one states are burdened by the anachronistic solutions to problems of
a bygone day-a day when this pernicious element in our society, the
"drunken driver," was of minor consequence at best in most areas of the
country.
The spiralling cost to this nation, both in terms of economics and human
intelligence, a most precious resource, bears devout scrutiny by our nation's
lawmakers, for the citizens of our country need and deserve protection from
the thoughtless individuals who have turned automobiles into a frighteningly
dangerous weapon.
Steven Adelman
